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Abstract
What is the best way to define algorithmic fairness? While
many definitions of fairness have been proposed in the com-
puter science literature, there is no clear agreement over a par-
ticular definition. In this work, we investigate ordinary peo-
ple’s perceptions of three of these fairness definitions. Across
two online experiments, we test which definitions people per-
ceive to be the fairest in the context of loan decisions, and
whether fairness perceptions change with the addition of sen-
sitive information (i.e., race of the loan applicants). Overall,
one definition (calibrated fairness) tends to be more preferred
than the others, and the results also provide support for the
principle of affirmative action.
Introduction
Algorithms are increasingly being used in high-impact do-
mains of decision-making, such as loans, hiring, bail, and
university admissions, with wide-ranging societal implica-
tions. However, issues have arisen regarding the fairness of
these algorithmic decisions. For example, the risk assess-
ment software, COMPAS, used by judicial systems in many
states, predicts a score indicating the likelihood of a defen-
dant committing a crime if given bail. ProPublica analyzed
recidivism predictions from COMPAS for criminal defen-
dants, and looked at false positive rates and false negative
rates for defendants of different races. It argued that the
tool is biased against black defendants (Angwin et al. 2016).
Equivant (formerly called Northpointe), the company that
developed the COMPAS tool, on the other hand, focused
on positive predictive value, which is similar for whites and
blacks (Dieterich, Mendoza, and Brennan 2016). That is, by
some measures of fairness, the tool was found to be biased
against blacks; meanwhile by other measures, it was not.
Which measures are fair?
The above scenario is not a rare case. Given the increas-
ing pervasiveness of automated decision-making systems,
there’s a growing concern among both computer scientists
and the public for how to ensure algorithms are fair. While
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several definitions of fairness have recently been proposed
in the computer science literature, there’s a lack of agree-
ment among researchers about which definition is the most
appropriate (Gajane and Pechenizkiy 2017). It is very un-
likely that one definition of fairness will be sufficient. This
is supported also by recent impossibility results that show
some fairness definitions cannot coexist (Kleinberg, Mul-
lainathan, and Raghavan 2016). Since the public is affected
by these algorithmic systems, it is important to investigate
public views of algorithmic fairness (Lee and Baykal 2017;
Lee, Kim, and Lizarondo 2017; Lee 2018; Binns et al. 2018;
Woodruff et al. 2018).
While substantial research has been done in moral psy-
chology to understand people’s perceptions of fairness
(e.g, Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984), (Bazerman, White, and
Loewenstein 1995) (1995)), relatively little work has been
done to understand how the general public views fairness
criteria in algorithmic decision making: Pierson (2017) in-
vestigated how two different factors influence views on algo-
rithmic fairness, Plane et al. (2017) explored human percep-
tions of discrimination in targeted online advertising, Grgic´-
Hlacˇa et al. (2018), Grgic´-Hlacˇa et al. (2018) studied human
perceptions of features used in algorithmic decision making,
Binns et al. (2018) examined people’s perception of justice
in algorithmic decision making under different explanation
styles. In contrast to this work, our goal is to understand
how people perceive the fairness definitions proposed in the
recent computer science literature, that is, the outcomes al-
lowed by these definitions.
By testing people’s perception of different fairness defi-
nitions, we hope to spur more work on understanding def-
initions of fairness that are appropriate for particular con-
texts. In line with recent work examining public attitudes
of the ethical programming of machines (Bonnefon, Shar-
iff, and Rahwan 2016; Awad et al. 2018), we suggest that
these public attitudes serve as a useful and important input
in a conversation between technologists and ethicists. These
findings can help technologists to develop decision-making
algorithms with fairness principles aligned with those of the
general public, to make sure that designs are sensitive to the
prevailing notions of fairness in society. Crowdsourcing can
also be used to understand how preferences vary across ge-
ographies and cultures.
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Definitions of Fairness
Broadly, we investigate a concept of fairness known as dis-
tributive justice, or fairness regarding the outcomes (Adams
1963; Adams 1965). However, which characteristics regard-
ing the individual should be relevant and which should be
irrelevant to fairness? We instantiate our study via investigat-
ing two characteristics: task-specific similarity (loan repay-
ment rate) and a sensitive attribute (race), and collect data
on attitudes toward the relevancy of these characteristics. In
principle, fairness is the absence of any bias based on an in-
dividual’s inherent or acquired characteristics that are irrele-
vant in the particular context of decision-making (Choulde-
chova 2017). In many contexts, these inherent characteristics
(referred to as ‘sensitive attributes’ or ‘protected attributes’
in the computer science literature), are gender, religion, race,
skin color, age, or national origin.
We restrict our emphasis to three fairness definitions from
the computer science literature. We choose to test these three
definitions because these definitions can be easily opera-
tionalized as distinct decisions in the context of loan scenar-
ios that are easily understandable by ordinary people. In our
experiments, we map these definitions (or constrained ver-
sions of the definitions) to distinct loan allocation choices,
and test people’s judgments of these choices. We summarize
the three fairness definitions as follows:
Treating similar individuals similarly. Dwork et al. (2012)
formulate fairness as treating similar individuals (with re-
spect to certain attributes) similarly in receiving a favorable
decision, where the similarity of any two individuals is de-
termined on the basis of a similarity distance metric, spe-
cific to the task at hand, and that ideally represents a notion
of ground truth in regard to the decision context. Given this
similarity metric, an algorithm would be fair if its decisions
satisfied the Lipschitz condition (a continuity and similarity
measure) defined with respect to the metric. In our loan al-
location scenario, individuals with similar repayment rates
should receive similar amounts of money.
Never favor a worse individual over a better one. In the
context of online learning, Joseph et al. (2016) define fair-
ness, in a setting where a single individual is to be selected
for a favorable decision, as always choosing a better indi-
vidual (with higher expected value of some measure of in-
herent quality) with a probability greater than or equal to
the probability of choosing a worse individual. This defi-
nition promotes meritocracy with respect to the candidate’s
inherent quality. Joseph et al. (2016) apply this definition of
fairness to the setting of contextual bandits, a classical se-
quential decision-making process, by utilizing the expected
reward to determine the quality of an action (an arm as in
the bandit setting). Each arm represents a different subpop-
ulation, and each subpopulation may have its own function
that maps decision context to expected payoff. In our loan
allocation scenario, an individual with a higher repayment
rate should obtain at least as much money as her peer.
Calibrated fairness. The third definition, that we refer to as
‘calibrated fairness’, is formulated by Liu et al. (2017) in the
setting of sequential decision-making[1]. Calibrated fairness
[1]Note that Kleinberg, Mullainathan, and Raghavan (2016),
selects individuals in proportion to their merit. In a multi-
armed bandit setting, this means that an arm would be pulled
with a probability that its pull would result the largest reward
if all the arms are pulled. When the merit is known (underly-
ing true quality), calibrated fairness implies the meritocratic
fairness of Joseph et al. (2016). Furthermore, as argued by
Liu et al. (2017), calibrated fairness implies Dwork et al.
(2016) for a suitably chosen similarity metric. In our loan
allocation scenario, we interpret calibrated fairness as re-
quiring that two individuals with repayment rates r1 and r2,
respectively, should obtain r1/(r1 + r2) and r2/(r1 + r2)
amount of money, respectively[2].
Overview of Present Research
In the present research, we ask: when do people endorse one
fairness definition over another?
First, we want to understand how support for the three
definitions of fairness depends on variation in the similarity
of the target individuals. The three definitions differ in how
this comparison between task-specific metrics should mat-
ter.
We are also interested to understand how information
about the race of the two target individuals influences
these fairness perceptions. Direct discrimination is the phe-
nomenon of discriminating against an individual simply be-
cause of their membership, or perceived membership, in cer-
tain protected (or sensitive) attributes, such as age, disabil-
ity, religion, gender, and race (Ellis and Watson 2012). All
three definitions agree that, conditioned on the relevant task-
specific metric, an attribute such as race should not be rele-
vant to decision-making.[3] Information about race may mat-
ter, however, since people may consider race to be an im-
portant factor for distributive justice. For example, in deci-
sions promoting affirmative action, people may believe that
considering race is important in order to address historical
inequities. If that is the case, then definitions of algorith-
mic fairness may need to take into account such sensitive
attributes.
Across two online experiments, we investigate how peo-
ple perceive algorithmic fairness in the context of loans,
which is a setting with a divisible good to allocate. We em-
ploy a scenario where a loan officer must decide how to al-
locate a limited amount of loan money to two individuals.
In Study 1, we test how the individuals’ task-specific sim-
ilarity (i.e., loan repayment rates) influences perceptions of
fairness, in the absence of information about race. In Study
2, we test how the individuals’ race may, along with their
loan repayment rates, influence perceptions of fairness. For
Chouldechova (2017) define ‘calibration’ in a different way, that
includes the notion of a sensitive attribute.
[2]This is a slightly different version of the formal definition
in Liu et al. (2017), which would take the ratio in proportion to the
rate at which one individual repays while the other does not, but we
feel a more intuitive way to capture the idea of calibrated fairness
in our setting.)
[3]Here, we assume that the treating similar individuals simi-
larly definition (Dwork et al. 2012) does not use race as a relevant
dimension for judging individual similarity.
the purpose of the study, we need to interpret these fairness
definitions, which are formalized for choosing a single in-
dividual for a favorable decision (or assigning an indivisible
good) to this setting where the good is divisible. Across both
experiments, we investigate fairness perceptions in the U.S.
population.
Study 1 (No Sensitive Information)
In this study, our motivation is to investigate how informa-
tion on an individual task-specific feature (i.e., the candi-
dates’ loan repayment rate) influences perceptions of fair-
ness. We present participants with a scenario in which two
individuals have each applied for a loan. The participants
know no personal information about the two individuals ex-
cept their loan repayment rates. We choose three allocation
rules, described in the following paragraphs, that allow us to
formulate qualitative judgments regarding the three fairness
definitions.
Procedure
We recruited 200 participants from Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) on March 18-19, 2018. The majority of them
identified themselves as white (82%), 8% as black, 6% as
Asian or Asian-American, 2% as Hispanic, and the rest with
multiple races. The average age was 39.43 (SD = 12.47).
Most (91%) had attended some college, while almost all
other participants had a high school degree or GED. (All de-
mographic information was self-reported.) All participants
were U.S. residents, and each were paid $0.20 for partici-
pating.
We presented participants with the scenario presented in
Figure 4 in the appendix.
This experiment employed a between-subjects design
with four conditions. We varied the individual candidates’
similarity (dissimilarity) in ability to pay back their loan
(i.e., their loan repayment rate), as an operationalization of
task-specific similarity (dissimilarity) relevant to the three
fairness definitions. Participants were randomly shown one
of four loan repayment rates: 55% and 50% (Treatment 1),
70% and 40% (Treatment 2), 90% and 10% (Treatment 3),
and 100% and 20% (Treatment 4). One treatment had a very
small difference between the loan repayment rates of the two
candidates (Treatment 1). The next treatment had a larger
difference between the loan repayment rates (Treatment 2),
with the next two treatments (Treatments 3 and 4) having a
much larger difference in their loan repayment rates. Each
participant was only shown one Treatment.
We held all other information about the two candidates
constant. We then presented participants with three possi-
ble decisions for how to allocate the money between the two
individuals. The order of the three decisions was counterbal-
anced.
Each decision was designed to help us to untangle the
three fairness definitions.
“All A” Decision. Give all the money to the candidate
with the higher payback rate. This decision is allowed in
all treatments under meritocratic fairness as defined Joseph
et al. (2016), where a worse applicant is never favored over a
better one. It would also be allowed under the definition for-
mulated by Dwork et al. (2012), in the more extreme treat-
ments, and even in every treatment in the case that the simi-
larity metric was very discerning. This decision would not be
allowed in any treatment under the calibrated fairness defi-
nition (Liu et al. 2017).
“Equal” Decision. Split the money 50/50 between the
candidates, giving $25,000 to each. This decision is al-
lowed in all treatments under Dwork et al. (2012) – treat-
ing similar people similarly. Moreover, under their defini-
tion, when two individuals are deemed to be similar to each
other, then this is the textitonly allowable decision (in Treat-
ment 1, for example). This decision is also allowed in all
the treatments under the meritocratic definition (Joseph et
al. 2016), as the candidate with the higher loan repayment
rate is given at least as much as the other candidate, and,
hence, is weakly favored. The decision, however, would not
be allowed in any treatment under calibrated fairness (Liu et
al. 2017), since the candidates are not being treated in pro-
portion of their quality (loan repayment rate).
“Ratio” Decision. Split the money between two candi-
dates in proportion of their loan repayment rates. This
decision is allowed in all treatments under calibrated fair-
ness, where resources are divided in proportion to the true
quality of the candidates. Moreover, this is the only deci-
sion allowed under this definition. This decision could also
align with the definition proposed by Dwork et al. (2012),
but only for suitably defined similarity metrics that allow
the distance between decisions implied by the ratio alloca-
tion. Finally, this decision would be allowed under merito-
cratic fairness (Joseph et al. 2016) for the same reasons as
the “Equal” decision. Namely, the candidate with the higher
loan repayment rate is weakly favored to the other candidate.
It is important to note that we are testing human percep-
tions regarding the outcomes that different fairness defini-
tion allow, not the definitions themselves. However, if a cer-
tain definition allows multiple decisions, then we would ex-
pect these decisions to receive similar support. Where the
perception of the fairness of outcomes is inconsistent with
the allowable decisions for a rule, this is worthwhile to un-
derstand.
If it is true that participants most prefer the treating sim-
ilar people similarly definition, one would expect that they
would prefer the “Equal” decision to the other two decisions
for a wider range of similarity metrics and treatments. If it
is true that participants most prefer the meritocratic defini-
tion, one would expect no significant difference in support
for the three different decisions. If it is true that participants
most prefer the calibrated fairness definition, one would ex-
pect that the “Ratio” decision is perceived as more fair than
the other two decisions.
We formulated the following set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1A. Across all treatments, participants perceive
the “Ratio” decision as more fair than the “Equal” decision.
Hypothesis 1B. Across all treatments, participants perceive
the “Ratio” decision as more fair than the “All A” decision.
Furthermore, we made the following predictions:
Hypothesis 2. Participants perceive the “Equal” decision as
more fair than the “All A” decision in Treatment 1. That
is, participants may view the candidates in Treatment 1 as
“similar enough” to be treated similarly.
Hypothesis 3. Participants perceive the “All A” decision as
more fair than the “Equal” decision in Treatments 3 and 4.
Figure 1: Comparison of means (with 95% CI) for Study 1.
Where * signifies p <0.05, ** p <0.01, and *** p <0.001.
Results
First, we tested hypotheses H1A and H1B, which conjecture
that participants will consider the “Ratio” decision as the
most fair. We found evidence in support of H1A in all treat-
ments: participants consistently rated dividing the $50,000
between the two individuals in proportion of their loan re-
payment rates (the “Ratio” decision) as more fair than split-
ting the $50,000 equally (the “Equal” decision) (see Figure
1). We found partial support for H1B: participants rated the
“Ratio” decision as more fair than the “All A” decision in
Treatments 1 and 2 (see Figure 1).
Second, we found that participants in Treatment 1 rated
the “Equal” decision as more fair than the “All A” definition
(see Figure 1), supporting H2. We see that when the dif-
ference in the loan repayment rates of the individuals was
small (5%), participants perceived the decision to divide the
money equally between the individuals as more fair than giv-
ing all the money to the individual with the higher loan re-
payment rate.
Third, we found that participants rated the “All A” deci-
sion as more fair than the “Equal” decision in Treatment 3,
but not in Treatment 4 (see Figure 1).
Discussion
We see that across all treatments, participants in Study 1 per-
ceived the “Ratio” decision – the only decision that aligns
with calibrated fairness – to be more fair than the “Equal”
decision – the only decision that is always aligned with the
treating people similarly definition. One possible explana-
tion is that calibrated fairness implies treating people simi-
larly for a similarity metric (Liu et al. 2017) that is based on
a notion of merit.
In Treatments 1 and 2, participants rated the “Ratio” deci-
sion – the only decision that aligns with calibrated fairness –
to be more fair than the “All A” decision. Note that the mer-
itocratic definition is the only definition that always allows
the “All A” decision. No significant difference was discov-
ered for Treatments 3 and 4, where one candidate has a much
higher repayment rate.
Furthermore, participants viewed individuals to be simi-
lar enough to be treated similarly only when the difference
in the applicants’ loan repayment rates was very small (ap-
proximately 5%).
Study 2 (With Sensitive Information)
In this study, our motivation is to investigate how the ad-
dition of sensitive information to information on an individ-
ual task-specific feature (i.e., the candidates’ loan repayment
rate) influences perceptions of fairness.
We employed the same experimental paradigm as in
Study 1, presenting participants with the scenario of two in-
dividuals applying for a loan, and three possible ways of al-
locating the loan money. Importantly, in Study 2, in addition
to providing information on the individuals’ loan repayment
rates, we also provided information on the individuals’ race.
We investigate how information on the candidates’ loan re-
payment rates and the candidates’ race influence people’s
fairness judgments of the three allocation decisions.
Procedure
We recruited a separate sample of 1800 participants from
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) on April 20-21, 2018,
none of whom had taken part in Study 1. Most of them iden-
tified as white (74%), 9% as black, 7% as Asian or Asian-
American, 5% as Hispanic, and the rest with multiple races.
The average age was 36.97 (SD = 12.54). Most (89%) had
attended some college, while almost all other participants
had a high school degree or GED. All participants were U.S.
residents, and each was paid $0.20 for participating. (All de-
mographic information was self-reported.)
We presented participants with the same scenario as in
Study 1, but this time also providing the candidates’ race and
gender. We held the gender of the candidates constant (both
were male), and randomized race (black or white). Thus, ei-
ther the white candidate had the higher loan repayment rate,
or the black candidate had the higher loan repayment rate.
The question presented to the participants in Study 2 can be
found in Figure Figure 5 in the appendix.
We presented the same question and choices for loan al-
locations, and tested the same hypotheses, as in Study 1.
Figure 2: Comparison of means (with 95% CI) for Study 2
(when the individual with the higher loan repayment rate is
white). Where * signifies p <0.05, ** p <0.01, and *** p
<0.001.
Results
We found that participants viewed the “Ratio” decision as
more fair than the “Equal” decision in Treatments 2, 3, and
4, regardless of race, in support of H1A. We also found that
participants viewed the “Ratio” decision as more fair than
the “All A” decision in all treatments, regardless of race, thus
supporting H1B. (See Figures 2 and 3.) Thus, participants
in Study 2 consistently gave most support to the decision to
divide the $50,000 between the two individuals in proportion
to their loan repayment rates.
Furthermore, we found that participants viewed the
“Equal” decision as more fair than the “All A” decision in
Treatment 1, regardless of race, in support of H2 (see Fig-
ures 2 and 3). Participants also rated the “Equal” decision
as more fair than the “All A” decision in Treatment 2, but
only when the candidate with the higher repayment rate was
white (see Figure 2).
When the difference between the two candidates’ repay-
ment rates was larger (Treatments 3 and 4), participants
viewed the “All A” decision as more fair than the “Equal”
decision but only when the candidate with the higher repay-
ment rate was black (see Figure 3). By contrast, when the
candidate with the higher loan repayment rate was white,
participants did not rate the two decisions differently (see
Figure 2).
Figure 3: Comparison of means (with 95% CI) for Study 2
(when the individual with the higher loan repayment rate is
black). Where * signifies p <0.05, ** p <0.01, and *** p
<0.001.
Discussion
In Study 2, we tested whether participants’ perceptions of
these three fairness definitions could be influenced by addi-
tional information regarding the candidates’ race.
Our results show that participants perceived the “Ratio”
decision to be more fair than the other two, hence supporting
the results from Study 1 and the related discussion. These re-
sults are not dependent on the race attribute. Furthermore,
regardless of race, when the difference between the loan
repayment rates was small (Treatment 1), participants pre-
ferred the “Equal” decision to the “All A” decision. This
supports the corresponding results from Study 1, Treatment
1, which indicate that one should account for similarity of
individuals when designing fair rules.
However, we also found evidence that race does affect
participants’ perception of fairness. When the difference in
loan repayment rates was larger (Treatments 3 and 4), par-
ticipants rated the “All A” decision as more fair than the
“Equal” decision, but only when the candidate with the
higher repayment rate was black. These results suggest a
boundary condition of H3: people may support giving all
the loan money to the candidate with the higher payback
rate, compared to splitting the money equally, when the can-
didate with the higher payback rate is a member of a group
that is historically disadvantaged.
Each definition, from meritocratic to similarity to cali-
brated fairness is successively stronger in our context, ruling
out additional decisions. In this light, it is interesting that
the ratio decision is most preferred, providing support for
the calibrated fairness definition, even though this definition
is the strongest of the three in the present context. When
historically disadvantaged individuals have a higher repay-
ment rate, participants are more supportive of more decisive
allocations in favor of the stronger, and historically disad-
vantaged, individual.
Conclusion
People broadly show a preference for the “Ratio” decision,
which is indicative of their support for the calibrated fairness
definition (Liu et al. 2017), as compared to the treating sim-
ilar people similarly (Dwork et al. 2012) and meritocratic
Joseph et al. definitions. We also find in Study 2 some sup-
port for the principle of affirmative action.
Through the use of crowdsourcing, we can elicit informa-
tion on public attitudes towards different definitions of algo-
rithmic fairness, and how individual characteristics, such as
task-specific features (e.g., loan repayment rates) and sensi-
tive attributes (e.g., race) could be relevant in fair decision-
making. Understanding public attitudes can help to continue
a dialogue between technologists and ethicists in the de-
sign of algorithms that make decisions of consequence to
the public. For example, the three fairness definitions exam-
ined here agree that, conditioned on the task-specific metric,
an attribute such as race should not be relevant to decision-
making. Yet, we find some treatments under which people’s
attitudes about loan decisions change when race is provided
to the context.
This paper opens up several directions for future research.
Beyond testing additional definitions, future experiments
could in addition specify whether the decision was made by
a human or an algorithm. Psychological theories of mind
may influence people’s fairness judgments. Third, future
work could investigate how people perceive fairness in other
contexts, such as university admissions or bail decisions,
where there is no divisible resource but rather a definite deci-
sion needs to be made, and in the university case in the con-
text of a resource constraint. Fourth, further research could
examine why the availability of additional personal or sen-
sitive information influences perceptions of fairness. Why
do people consider factors such as race important for their
fairness ratings? And to what extent are people willing to
endorse affirmative action in defining algorithmic fairness?
Finally, it is important to consider how to incorporate the
general public’s views into algorithmic decision-making.
These results are only the start of a research program on
understanding ordinary people’s fairness judgments of def-
initions of algorithmic fairness. As the literature on moral
psychology has shown, people often make inconsistent and
unreasoned moral judgments (Greene 2014). Indeed, re-
search on moral judgments in regard to the decisions made
by autonomous vehicles (the “moral machine”) has shown
that people approve of utilitarian autonomous vehicles, but
are unwilling to purchase utilitarian autonomous vehicles for
themselves (Bonnefon, Shariff, and Rahwan 2016). On the
other hand, research in moral psychology shows that peo-
ple can engage in sophisticated moral reasoning, thinking
in an impartial, bias-free way, resulting in moral judgments
that favor the greater good (Huang, Greene, and Bazerman
2019). Future research could investigate how moral rea-
soning interventions could influence people’s fairness judg-
ments in the domain of algorithmic fairness.
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Appendix
To be eligible to take our surveys, the Amazon Mechanical
Turk workers had to be located in the United States of Amer-
ica. We stipulated this restriction via TurkPrime, which is a
platform for performing crowdsourced research when using
Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (’MTurker’) could
only participate in on one of the two studies, and not both.
The first section contains all questions the workers were
asked in the studies. The second section contains the demo-
graphics data for the respondents of both studies. The third
section details how many participants in each study were
shown the four treatments.
Questions from the studies
The question asked in Study 1 is presented in Figure 4. The
question asked in Study 2 is presented in Figure 5.
Figure 4: Question presented to the participants in Study 1.
Figure 5: Question presented to the participants in Study 2.
Demographics questions Every Amazon Mechanical
Turk worker in both the surveys was asked that study’s ques-
tion. After they answered that, they were asked the follow-
ing demographics questions that were voluntary to answer.
Since they were voluntary to answer, not all respondents an-
swered them, although most (>90%) answered some or all
of them.
1. What state do you live in?
2. Do you identify as:
# Male
# Female
# Other (please specify):
3. What is the highest level of school you have completed or
the highest degree you have received?
# Less than high school degree
# High school degree or equivalent
# Some college but no degree
# Associate degree
# Bachelor degree
# Graduate degree
4. Do you identify as:
2 Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino
2 White
2 Black or African-American
2 American-Indian or Alaskan Native
2 Asian
2 Asian-American
2 Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
2 Other (please specify):
5. In what type of community do you live:
2 City or urban community
2 Suburban community
2 Rural community
2 Other (please specify):
6. What is your age?
7. Which political party do you identify with?
2 Democratic Party
2 Republican Party
2 Green Party
2 Libertarian Party
2 Independent
2 Other (please specify):
Study 1: Demographic information of the
participants
Figure 6: Age distribution of the participants in Study 1.
Figure 7: Education of the participants in Study 1.
Figure 8: Gender breakdown of the participants in Study 1.
Figure 9: Political Affiliation of the participants in Study 1.
Figure 10: Race of the participants in Study 1.
Figure 11: Breakup by state of the participants in Study 1.
Figure 12: Residential breakdown of the participants in
Study 1.
Study 2: Demographic information of the
participants
Figure 13: Age distribution of the participants in Study 2.
Figure 14: Education of the participants in Study 2.
Figure 15: Gender breakdown of the participants in Study 2.
Figure 16: Political Affiliation of the participants in Study 2.
Figure 17: Race of the participants in Study 2.
Figure 18: Residential breakdown of the participants in
Study 2.
